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I. INTRODUCTION
After he was denied medical leave and fired from his job at Fox-
wood Resorts Casino, Joseph Chayoon sued seventeen managers under
the Family Medical Leave Act. 2 Unlike most employees who file FMLA
claims, Chayoon never had the opportunity to present the merits of his
case to the district court.8 Because the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe
owns the casino, the district court and Second Circuit held tribal sover-
eign immunity shields both the casino and its managers from lawsuit,
even though the managers are not tribe members. 4
Chayoon's case is one of many recent examples of courts ex-
tending tribal sovereignty to businesses owned by tribes.5 Courts
nationwide cite the Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Kiowa Tribe of
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.6 for the principle that
businesses owned by tribes, operated for the sole purpose of generating
profits for the tribes, are entitled to sovereign immunity.
This Note is based partly on an examination of every state and
federal court opinion that cites Kiowa. More than seventy opinions use
Kiowa to extend sovereign immunity to a wide range of tribe-owned
businesses, including casinos, payday loan companies, and construc-
tion contractors.
After reviewing these cases, this Note argues that the recent
court decisions have extended the Supreme Court's tribal immunity
doctrine too far. The Court held in Kiowa that tribes receive sovereign
immunity in civil suits related to tribes' commercial activities.7 This,
however, should not immediately extend to all businesses that are
2. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).
3. Chayoon v. Chao, 355 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2004).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 346 (2d Cir. 2000)
(upholding dismissal of copyright and contract claims against tribe-owned museum on
sovereign immunity grounds); Florida Paraplegic Association v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians, 166 F.3d 1126, 1128 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Americans with Disabilities
Act does not apply to tribe-owned casinos); In re National Cattle Congress, 247 B.R. 259,
264 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000) (debtor cannot discharge debts owed to creditor Indian tribe
through Chapter 11 bankruptcy); State ex rel. Suthers v. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash
Loans, No. 07CA0582, 2008 Colo. App. LEXIS 624 (Colo. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2008) (reversing
trial court's denial of sovereign immunity-based dismissal to tribe-owned payday loan
Internet company). See Part III for a complete discussion of these cases and other post-
Kiowa extensions of tribal sovereign immunity to for-profit corporations. See the Appendix
for a chart summarizing every opinion in which federal and state courts have cited Kiowa to
grant sovereign immunity to tribe-owned businesses.
6. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
7. 523 U.S. at 760.
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owned by tribes.8 It also certainly should not extend to employees of
businesses owned by tribes. Kiowa involved a land deal between a
tribe's development commission and a private party. The development
commission was performing a governmental function, albeit in a com-
mercial context. Such a function is far different from operating a
casino or payday loan company, whose only ties to the sovereign entity
are ownership.
Courts across the nation have broadened the application of tri-
bal sovereign immunity as tribes rapidly expand their casino
enterprises and enter into other businesses that have never been asso-
ciated with tribes, such as payday loan companies in inner cities.
Sovereign immunity presents significant unfairness to companies that
must compete with the tribes, customers who patronize the casinos,
and employees who work for the tribal businesses. A review of com-
pacts between states and tribes-necessary to allow tribal gaming
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 9-finds that they typically
contain weak tribal immunity waivers.10 And although Congress has
the power to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, it has not placed
enough limitations on the doctrine."
This Note proposes that courts, when determining whether to
grant tribal sovereign immunity, examine the function of the entity be-
ing sued. If the defendant performs a governmental role, such as
providing public transportation services, it should receive immunity.
Simply being owned by a tribe, however, should not entitle a company
to sovereign immunity. And it is a further stretch to apply that immu-
nity to employees of the business. Amid the growth of the Indian
gaming industry, it is important to set clear boundaries for tribal sov-
ereign immunity.
Part II briefly discusses the origins of tribal immunity and de-
scribes how the Supreme Court has applied that immunity to casinos
and other tribe-owned businesses.
Part III reviews decisions of lower state and federal courts that
grant immunity to businesses that have no relation to tribes other
than ownership. The lower courts are expanding the Supreme Court's
limited scope of tribal immunity.
8. This is different from a tribe-owned entity that provides a governmental service,
such as railroad, bus service, or garbage collection. In that case, the tribe-owned corporation
would have a much stronger case for sovereign immunity because it is performing a
governmental function.
9. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006).
10. See Part IV.C, infra.
11. See Part IV.B, infra.
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Part IV argues that either Congress, by statute, or states,
through compacts, should limit tribal sovereign immunity. A review of
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Actl 2 and caselaw interpreting it finds
that its abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity is very narrow and
would not apply to actions by private plaintiffs. A review of gaming
compacts between tribes and states, as required by the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, finds that the compacts often do not substantially ab-
rogate tribal sovereign immunity for casinos. States should insist on
sovereign immunity waivers when negotiating the compacts.
II. HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR COMMERCIAL
TRIBE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
This Part will trace the history of tribal sovereign immunity as
applied to tribal businesses. Courts have gradually expanded the lim-
its of tribal sovereign immunity to the point where businesses with
very little relation to tribal government can claim immunity from law-
suits. But tribal immunity, as created by the Supreme Court, was
never intended to extend that far. Until Kiowa,13 lower courts limited
tribal sovereign immunity to tribal governments.
A. Origins of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
The cases that lay the foundations for tribal immunity make
clear that the immunity originated because tribes were seen as sover-
eign governments.
The Supreme Court articulated the modern conception of tribal
sovereign immunity in Turner v. United States.14 In that 1919 case, a
landowner sued an Indian tribe claiming that tribal members had de-
stroyed the landowner's fence and the tribe did not prevent the
destruction. 15 The Court stated that a tribal government has the same
immunity as a state or federal government because it is "a distinct po-
litical community, with which it made treaties and which within its
own territory administered its own internal affairs."' 6 The articulation
of tribal sovereign immunity was dicta in this case, because the Court
based its holding for the tribe on "the lack of a substantive right to
12. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006).
13. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
14. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).




recover the damages resulting from failure of a government or its of-
ficers to keep the peace."17
The Supreme Court explicitly recognized tribal sovereignty
twenty-one years later in United States v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co.,1s when it held that a creditor could not collect money
from a tribe in federal court:
Indian Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional author-
ization. It is as though the immunity which was theirs as
sovereigns passed to the United States for their benefit, as their
tribal properties did. Possessing this immunity from direct suit, we
are of the opinion it possesses a similar immunity from cross-suits.
This seems necessarily to follow if the public policy which protects a
quasi-sovereignty from judicial attack is to be made effective.19
The Court also has extended tribal immunity to a tribe's exter-
nal affairs. In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe,20 the Court held that a tribe was immune from a lawsuit
from a state seeking to collect sales taxes from tribal sales. The Court
declined the state's request to limit the tribal sovereign immunity doc-
trine to "the tribal courts and the internal affairs of tribal
government."21 The Court stated that it is "not disposed to modify the
long-established principle of tribal sovereign immunity."22
These foundational cases demonstrate that although the Su-
preme Court has broadly applied sovereign immunity to tribes,
immunity has always extended to the behavior of tribal governments,
whether external or internal, commercial or noncommercial. The rest
of this Part demonstrates that Kiowa did not extend tribal sovereignty
to the degree that many lower courts have suggested.
Although recent court opinions have broadly applied immunity
to businesses affiliated with tribes, courts have not always used such
expansive interpretation. Before Kiowa, courts generally observed the
important distinction between tribal governments and tribal
businesses.
Justice Harry Blackmun articulated the boundaries of tribal
sovereign immunity in a concurring opinion to Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v.
17. Id. at 357- 358.
18. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
19. Id. at 512. See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) ("Indian
tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.").
20. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
21. Id. at 510.
22. Id.
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Department of Game, which held that a state trial court could not en-
force state regulation of tribal fishing.23 Although Blackmun joined the
court's opinion, he wrote: "I entertain doubts, however, about the con-
tinuing vitality in this day of the doctrine of tribal immunity as it was
enunciated in United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
... I am of the view that that doctrine may well merit re-examination
in an appropriate case."2 4 Unlike many of the post-Kiowa cases, the
Court in Puyallup granted sovereign immunity to a tribe rather than a
tribe-owned corporation. But even within those narrow limits, Black-
mun indicated concern with the doctrine.
Pre-Kiowa cases from lower courts respected those limits. A
construction company sued a tribe-owned housing authority for
$600,000 it claimed was owed for work. In Namekagon Development
Co. v. Bois Forte Reservation Housing Authority, the U.S. District
Court for Minnesota refused to grant sovereign immunity to the hous-
ing authority.25 In its opinion, the Court wrote, "[t]o dismiss this suit
against the local Housing Authority on grounds of sovereign immunity
would be grossly unfair."26 The Court, therefore, recognized that con-
tract law should apply to a commercial enterprise, even if it is owned
and operated by a tribal government.
Even when a tribal entity received sovereign immunity, some
courts have held that employees of tribe-owned businesses do not auto-
matically receive immunity from the same lawsuit. For example, in
Tenneco Oil Co. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians, the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed a district court's decision to grant sovereign immunity to a tribe
in a contract dispute with an oil company. 27 But the Court reversed
the district court's decision to grant sovereign immunity to members of
the tribe's business community, finding that "the named tribal officials
are not protected by the Tribe's immunity, and the suit may proceed
against them."28
Therefore, decades before Kiowa, it was well accepted that tri-
bal sovereign immunity extended only to governmental functions.
23. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
24. Id. at 179 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
25. 395 F. Supp. 23, 28 (D. Minn. 1974).
26. Id. at 29.
27. 725 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1984).
28. Id. at 575.
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B. Kiowa Provides Sovereign Immunity to the Commercial Activities
of Tribal Governments
Despite the rapid growth of Indian gaming and other commer-
cial enterprises, the Supreme Court has heard very few tribal
immunity cases in recent decades, providing little guidance to lower
courts. The most significant recent opinion was the Court's 1998 Ki-
owa ruling. The Court found that a tribe's development corporation
was immune from a lawsuit by a company that claims it was owed
money by the tribe. The Court declined to confine tribal immunity "to
reservations or to noncommercial activities."29
Although Kiowa has been repeatedly cited for an expansive
view of tribal sovereign immunity, the opinion was in line with earlier
cases and took a fairly narrow view of the doctrine. The Court ex-
pressed some discomfort with broad application of tribal sovereign
immunity in the commercial context:
At one time, the doctrine of tribal immunity from suit might have
been thought necessary to protect nascent tribal governments from
encroachments by States. In our interdependent and mobile society,
however, tribal immunity extends beyond what is needed to safe-
guard tribal self-governance. This is evident when tribes take part
in the Nation's commerce. Tribal enterprises now include ski re-
sorts, gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non-Indians. In this
economic context, immunity can harm those who are unaware that
they are dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity,
or who have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort victims. 30
The Court clearly recognized the problems created by broad ap-
plication of tribal sovereign immunity, particularly in light of the
growth of Indian casinos. But the Court stated that it was the role of
Congress, not the Supreme Court, to determine whether sovereign im-
munity should be confined to noncommercial or on-reservation
activities.3 1 Congress, the Court wrote, is better equipped than the ju-
diciary to determine the appropriate policy: "The capacity of the
Legislative Branch to address the issue by comprehensive legislation
counsels some caution by us in this area. Congress has occasionally
authorized limited classes of suits against Indian tribes and has al-
ways been at liberty to dispense with such tribal immunity or to limit
it."32
29. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v.Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998).
30. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145
(1973)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 759 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
2009 137
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 5:1:131
Even under the majority's expansive interpretation, Kiowa only
stands for the principle that tribal governments are entitled to sover-
eign immunity in their commercial activities, even those that occur off
the reservation. As opinions in recent years demonstrate, lower courts
have expanded tribal sovereign immunity far beyond the boundaries
articulated in Kiowa.
III. AFTER KIOWA, COURTS DRAMATICALLY EXPANDED SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY FOR TRIBAL CORPORATIONS
This Part will illustrate the broad application of tribal immu-
nity to commercial, for-profit businesses owned by tribes. Kiowa
involves commercial activities of a tribe as it conducts a traditional
function of tribal government: business development. But decisions
from lower courts after Kiowa have extended tribal sovereignty even
further: to shield for-profit businesses that are owned by tribes and do
not perform a governmental function.
This Part is based on a review of every federal and state court
opinion citing Kiowa from 1998 through the present. In sum, seventy-
one opinions cite Kiowa as a primary reason to extend sovereign immu-
nity to a tribe-owned commercial entity. Courts have cited Kiowa
when providing immunity to a wide variety of tribal entities, including
tobacco companies, snow removal contractors, truck stops, hotels, and
payday loan companies. The most common recipients of immunity,
however, are casinos. Of the seventy-one opinions, forty-six provided
immunity to casinos or casino employees. Unless a casino compact be-
tween a tribe and a state explicitly contains a waiver for the specific
type of claim at issue, courts are likely to find that the casino enjoys
tribal sovereign immunity. An off-reservation casino is just as likely to
receive sovereign immunity as an on-reservation casino. 8
The types of claims receiving immunity also vary greatly. Of
the seventy-one opinions, twenty-six grant sovereign immunity in em-
ployment-related disputes, such as workplace discrimination,
harassment, and Family and Medical Leave Act violations. Twenty-
one of the opinions grant sovereign immunity in personal injury
claims, often filed by customers who were injured in a casino. Seven-
teen of the opinions involve breach of contract claims filed by
companies that did business with the tribal-owned corporations. Other
opinions involve copyright disputes, patent infringement and alleged
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
33. Kiowa, 527 U.S. at 754 (stating that this distinction is not relevant in determining
whether a tribal business receives sovereign immunity).
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Both federal and state courts make use of Kiowa. Of the sev-
enty-one opinions, thirty-nine came from federal courts, and thirty-two
were state court opinions.
The next three sections in this Part describe and analyze a rep-
resentative sample of these cases to illustrate the wide range of
contexts in which Kiowa has been cited to expand tribal immunity to
corporations.
A. Sovereign Immunity Expanded to Wide Range of Tribal
Businesses, Particularly Casinos
First, it is important to recognize that casinos are not the only
tribe-owned businesses that have received sovereign immunity. In
some cases, the businesses are indistinguishable from privately-owned
companies. For example, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed a
trial court's finding that a tribe-owned Internet payday loan company
lacked sovereign immunity. In Colorado ex rel. Suthers, the Colorado
Attorney General subpoenaed a payday loan company as part of an in-
vestigation, but the company refused to comply with the subpoena,
citing sovereign immunity. 34 The state trial court denied the com-
pany's motion to dismiss, finding that it does not receive sovereign
immunity simply because it is owned by a tribe. 35 The appellate court
reversed and remanded the case, ordering the court to conduct fact-
finding and determine whether the payday loan company is an "arm" of
the tribe. "To the extent that the trial court's reference to 'tribal enti-
ties' indicated that the Miami Nation and the Santee Sioux Nation
were subject to the Attorney General's enforcement actions, the trial
court's order must be reversed."3 6
In a similar case, Ameriloan v. Superior Court, state regulators
brought an action against a tribe-owned Internet payday loan company
located in downtown Los Angeles. 37 The California Court of Appeal
found tribal sovereign immunity may shield the business from the law-
suit.3 8 The Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine
whether the payday loan company acts as an "arm of the tribe," noting
that "[tiribal sovereign immunity extends not only to the Indian tribes
34. 205 P.3d 389, 394-95 (Colo. 2008).
35. Id. at 396
36. Id., at 397.
37. 169 Cal. App. 4th 81, 83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
38. Id. at 89-91.
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themselves but also to those for-profit commercial entities that func-
tion as 'arms of the tribes.'"3 9
One court extended sovereign immunity to a tribe-owned to-
bacco business.40 The Tenth Circuit found that a tobacco sales and
distribution company owned by a tribe was entitled to sovereign immu-
nity.41 The Court, citing Kiowa, wrote that tribal sovereign immunity
"extends to subdivisions of a tribe, and even bars suits arising from a
tribe's commercial activities." 42 The Court did not explain how the to-
bacco business related to the tribe's governance, but found the fact that
the tribe owned the tobacco company sufficient for it to receive tribal
sovereign immunity.43
Because of the rapid growth of tribal gaming, many recent deci-
sions have granted sovereign immunity to casino corporations. In
Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino,4 4 the California Court of Ap-
peals, citing Kiowa, held that a tribe-owned casino was immune from a
lawsuit filed by a patron who was injured in a fight at the casino. 45
The court adopted a three-part test, first used by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota: 46
1. "Whether the business entity is organized for a purpose that is
governmental in nature, rather than commercial"47
2. "Whether the tribe and the business entity are closely linked in
governing structure and other characteristics" 48 and
3. "Whether federal policies intended to promote Indian tribal au-
tonomy are furthered by the extension of immunity to the business
entity."49
Using these three factors, the court found that the casino was immune.
The court further provided that gaming was used for "promoting the
self-determination of the Tribe"5 0 and therefore was governmental in
nature.5 1 Under this reasoning, any tribe-owned business would qual-
ify for tribal immunity because its profits flow to the tribe and
39. Id. at 97.
40. Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288 (10th Cir. 2008).
41. Id. at 1292.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 71 Cal. App. 4th 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
45. Id. (citing Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751 (1998)).
46. Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. 1996).
47. Trudgeon, 71 Cal. App. 4th at 638. (citing Gavle, 555 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. 1996)).
48. Id.
49. Id.




therefore promote "self-determination." The court did not address the
possibility of a business that is owned only partly by a tribe. The prof-
its from such a business also would help promote self-determination of
the tribe, but it would surely raise eyebrows if a court were to grant
sovereign immunity to that business. Such a ruling would allow a bus-
iness to escape all tort and contract law liability by selling a small
portion of its equity to an Indian tribe. The court in Trudgeon did not
articulate any reasonable limits to its grant of sovereign immunity to
businesses that promote a tribe's self-determination.
In the post-Kiowa era, courts have similarly taken a narrow ap-
proach to congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity. In Florida
Paraplegic Association v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,52 the plaintiff
sued a tribal casino for not installing wheelchair ramps in its restau-
rant and entertainment facility and providing other accommodations
required by the Americans with Disabilities Act.53 The district court
denied the tribe's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds,
finding that the ADA "is a statute of general applicability and noted
that there is a presumption that a general statute will apply to all per-
sons including Indians and their property interests."54 The Eleventh
Circuit reversed, finding that the ADA did not abrogate tribal sover-
eign immunity.55 The court found that a statute abrogates immunity
"only where the definitive language of the statute itself states an in-
tent either to abolish Indian tribes' common law immunity or to subject
tribes to suit under the act."5 6 Therefore, under this court's reasoning,
federal law only applies to tribal businesses if Congress explicitly
writes an abrogation provision.
B. Tribal Businesses Receive Broad Immunity from Contract
Claims, and Waivers are Rarely Found
Although high-profile cases often involve tort claims against
tribe-owned businesses, courts also have broadly applied sovereign im-
munity in contract cases. This creates tremendous unfairness for
companies that do business with corporations that are owned by tribes.
The Second Circuit interpreted Kiowa to extend tribal immu-
nity to a tribe-owned museum. In Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot
52. 166 F.3d 1126, 1128 (11th Cir. 1999).
53. Id. at 1127.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1131.
56. Id.
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Tribe,5 7 a film production company contracted with a museum to pro-
duce a movie about the Pequot War.5 8 After a disagreement about the
film script, the museum terminated the agreement. The owner of the
film company sued the museum for breach of contract, copyright in-
fringement, and various state tort law claims.5 9 The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the lawsuit, citing tribal sover-
eign immunity.6 0 Although the museum is a separate corporation that
does not perform traditional governmental functions, the Second Cir-
cuit held that Kiowa requires sovereign immunity: "[s]ince the Court's
precedents had previously sustained tribal immunity without drawing
distinctions based on where contested tribal activities occurred or
whether they were governmental or commercial in nature, the Court
would not now begin to draw such distinctions."61 The Court here pro-
vided that the tribe's voluntary entry into a contract with the film
producer was not sufficient to constitute a waiver of its sovereign im-
munity.62 Such broad application of sovereign immunity in contract
law deters companies from doing business with tribal corporations, be-
cause they are left powerless if the tribal entity breaches the contract.
Since Kiowa, courts have been reluctant to hold that contracts
implicitly waive tribal sovereign immunity. For example, in Welch
Contracting, Inc. v. North Carolina Department of Transportation,6 3
the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that a tribe-owned con-
tracting company did not waive its sovereign immunity against a
subcontractor simply by entering into a business arrangement with it.
Although a waiver of state sovereign immunity may occasionally be im-
plied by a contract, the Court stated, tribal sovereign immunity cannot
be implicitly waived.64
Sovereign immunity prevents bankrupt creditors from dis-
charging debts owed to Indian tribes. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of Iowa, in In re National Cattle Congress,65 con-
fronted this issue when a debtor attempted to extinguish its real estate
mortgage lien held by the Sac and Fox Tribe in exchange for a covenant
prohibiting gambling on the property. The bankruptcy court held that
57. 204 F.3d 343, 346 (2d Cir. 2000).
58. Id. at 346.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 357.
62. Id.
63. 175 N.C. App. 45 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
64. Id. at 55.
65. 247 B.R. 259, 264 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000).
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the debtor could not extinguish the mortgage lien because sovereign
immunity shielded the tribe.6 6 Extinguishing the debt through bank-
ruptcy, the Court held, would mean subjecting the tribe to the court's
jurisdiction.67 And such an action would be inappropriate, the court
stated, because "Congress has not unequivocally abrogated the Tribe's
immunity to suit under the Code. Nor has the Tribe made a clear and
express waiver of its sovereign immunity."6 8 This holding creates a
tremendously unfair playing field for companies that enter into busi-
ness arrangements with tribes. Courts have held that Indian tribes
may seek bankruptcy protection.69 Therefore, a company that owes a
debt to a tribe-owned business may not seek to modify that debt
through bankruptcy, but a tribe-owned business may receive Chapter
11 protection from debts it owes to other companies.
C. Employees of Tribe-Owned Companies also are Protected by
Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Not only have courts granted sovereign immunity to a wide
range of tribe-owned businesses, they also have extended immunity to
employees of the businesses, even if they have no other connection to
the tribe.
For example, in Chayoon's case described above, the Second
Circuit affirmed a district court's dismissal of a lawsuit against a tribe-
owned casino and its managers under the Family and Medical Leave
Act.70 The court found that the plaintiff "cannot circumvent tribal im-
munity by merely naming officers or employees of the Tribe when the
complaint concerns actions taken in defendants' official or representa-
tive capacities and the complaint does not allege they acted outside the
scope of their authority."7 '
The Ninth Circuit extended tribal sovereign immunity even fur-
ther in Cook v. AVI Casino Enterprises.72 There, the Ninth Circuit
found that both a tribe-owned casino and its employees were immune
from a lawsuit by a man who was catastrophically injured by a casino
employee who had been served alcohol at a casino party.73 The court
66. Id.
67. Id. at 272.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., In re Sandmar Corp., 12 B.R. 910, 917 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981).
70. Chayoon v. Chao, 355 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2004).
71. Id.
72. 548 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2008).
73. Id. at 720.
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stated that immunity extended to the tribe because "the settled law of
[the] circuit is that tribal corporations acting as an arm of the tribe
enjoy the same sovereign immunity granted to a tribe itself."74 Be-
cause the casino was created under tribal law and because the casino's
profits flow exclusively to the tribe, the Ninth Circuit found, the casino
was entitled to the tribe's sovereign immunity.7 5 The tribal ordinance
contained a sue-or-be-sued clause, but Cook's appeal did not raise the
issue of whether that should extend to the casinos or its employees.76
The court in Cook also held that the casino employees were immune
from a lawsuit seeking damages because they were acting in their ca-
pacity as "tribal employees."77
It is well-established that plaintiffs can seek injunctive relief
against tribal officials, under an Ex Parte Young7 8 theory of relief.79
However in Cook, the court refused to allow lawsuits for monetary
damages against tribal officials because the Ninth Circuit extended
federal sovereign immunity to employees of the United States when it
stated that: "[t]he principles that motivate the immunizing of tribal
officials from suit-protecting an Indian tribe's treasury and prevent-
ing a plaintiff from bypassing tribal immunity merely by naming a
tribal official-apply just as much to tribal employees when they are
sued in their official capacity."80 This portion of Cook had immediate
impact in another case. Two months after the Ninth Circuit opinion,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed
an employment discrimination lawsuit filed by a former casino em-
ployee against his managers.8 ' Although the managers were not tribal
members, 82 they were entitled to sovereign immunity under Cook, the
Court found specifically that" [w]hile these defendants may not be 'offi-
cials' of the Tribe, there is no doubt they are employees."83
As the Ninth Circuit has now decided tribal immunity applies
to employees acting within the scope of their employment, the impor-
74. Id. at 725.
75. Id. at 726.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 727.
78. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
79. See, e.g., New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 523 F. Supp. 2d 185, 298
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[Tlhe Second Circuit and other courts have held that a suit for injunctive
relief can be pursued against a tribal official in his official capacity so long as plaintiff can
maintain a cause of action under the applicable statute.").
80. Cook, 548 F.3d at 727.
81. Allen v. Mayhew, No. CIV S-04-0322-LKK-CMK, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13060
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2009).




tant question becomes not whether they are officials, but whether they
were acting within the scope of their employment."84 Courts across the
nation have continued to expanded sovereign immunity to the point
that now, even an individual who is not even a member of an Indian
tribe may be immune from lawsuit simply because he works for a busi-
ness owned by a tribe. 5 This Part has illustrated the recent vast
expansion of tribal sovereign immunity to for-profit businesses in the
past decade. With tribal businesses playing an increasingly prominent
role in the American economy, it is necessary to examine the fairness
of this expansion and potential limitations on tribal sovereign
immunity.
IV. THREE SOLUTIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE UNFAIRNESS: JUDICIAL
SELF-LIMITATION, CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION,
AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER
This Part will consider the three potential ways to restrict the
expansion of tribal sovereign immunity to for-profit businesses: judi-
cial limits, statute, and voluntary waiver. It will demonstrate that
none of these methods have been used effectively, even though it would
be consistent with constitutional caselaw to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity.
The post-Kiowa decisions have stretched tribal sovereign immu-
nity far beyond the scope envisioned in early cases such as Turner and
Fidelity. Those decisions recognized tribes as sovereign governments.
Nothing in the language of either the Turner or Fidelity decisions
would support independent, for-profit corporations receiving this
immunity.
The dramatic expansion of tribal sovereign immunity has also
created an unfair policy, particularly considering the rapid growth of
casinos and other tribe-owned businesses. Tribal gaming generates
more than $14 billion in revenues a year and employs more than
400,000 people, most of whom are not tribal members.8 6 It is unfair to
customers, employees, and most importantly, competitors, for these
tribe-owned businesses to be immune from contract and tort laws.
84. Id. at *16-17.
85. See, e.g., Marvel v. Elkhart County Court, Case No. 3:08-CV-529 RM, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 95752 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 21, 2008) (dismissing lawsuit against tribal officials,
citing tribal immunity); Cohen v. Winkleman, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1186 (W.D. Okla. 2006)
(dismissing claim against president of tribe-owned college, citing sovereign immunity).
86. Tribal Institute, available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/LISTS/gaming.htm.
(last visited 3/30/2010)
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Even the author of the majority opinion in Cook, Judge Gould,
recognized this unfair policy. In a separate concurrence, Judge Gould
described the outcome of the case as an "unjust result."8 7 He ques-
tioned whether the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity "could
sensibly be applied to actions wholly commercial in the gaming area
where the tribe has undertaken to compete and to provide services for
the general public."88 But he stated that the court had no other choice
but to grant immunity because of the Supreme Court's Kiowa opinion.
Judge Gould suggested three solutions to prevent future unfair
outcomes:
1) "the United States Supreme Court on review were to establish a
new rule limiting tribal sovereign immunity in this gaming
context;"89
2) "the Congress were to pass new legislation limiting the sover-
eign immunity of tribal entities involved in ubiquitous
commercial gaming activities across the United States;"90 or
3) "the Tribe itself were to take responsibility for its casino employ-
ees' actions, and affirmatively waive sovereign immunity in this
case permitting Cook's action to be resolved under a litigated ad-
versarial process."9 1
Judge Gould's concurrence is correct in that the result was unfair. But
he is incorrect to suggest that the result could not be avoided under
current Supreme Court caselaw.
This Part examines the three potential solutions, as outlined by
Judge Gould: 1) judicial limitation of sovereign immunity, 2) abroga-
tion of tribal sovereign immunity by Congress, and 3) voluntary waiver
of immunity by tribes. A review of statutes and gaming compacts finds
that neither of those occurs frequently. But both Congress and states
should be more open to passing abrogation statutes and insisting on
sovereign immunity waivers as conditions of approving gaming
compacts.
A. Courts Should Adopt a Functionalist Approach to Determining
Whether to Grant Sovereign Immunity
Judge Gould first suggests the Supreme Court revise its prece-
dent and limit sovereign immunity. As demonstrated above, it is not
necessary to reverse Kiowa to come to a different result than the Ninth
87. Cook, 548 F.3d at 727.
88. Id. at 728.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 728.
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Circuit reached in Cook. Instead, courts should view Kiowa as the
outer limits of tribal sovereign immunity and not expand it any further
than the Supreme Court's holding.
The Supreme Court's tribal immunity jurisprudence-including
Kiowa-does not require a court to grant sovereign immunity to a sep-
arate corporation that does not perform a governmental function. In
Kiowa, the industrial development commission, although acting in a
commercial context, was performing a traditional governmental func-
tion. Although many of the recent decisions have extended tribal
immunity to corporations owned by tribes, Kiowa never went that far.
Because tribal sovereign immunity is a court-created doctrine, courts
should feel obligated to go beyond the outer bounds set by the Supreme
Court.
Some critics of expanded sovereignty have suggested limiting
tribal immunity to on-reservation activities.92 But this is an artificial
distinction that does not comport with Supreme Court precedent or the
policy reasons for limiting the immunity doctrine. Many purely for-
profit activities could take place on reservations, even if they do not
involve government. Similarly, governmental activities entitled to tri-
bal immunity may occur off of the reservation.
A more correct reading of Kiowa and its predecessor Supreme
Court cases is that unless there is abrogation by Congress or waiver by
the tribe, tribal governments are immune from lawsuits, even if the
lawsuit is commercial in nature. But such sovereignty does not extend
to for-profit businesses owned by tribes. Using this reasoning, courts
should take a functionalist approach to tribal sovereign immunity.
They should use the following test: if a tribal entity is performing a
governmental function, regardless of whether it is commercial, the
tribe should be immune from lawsuit unless either Congress or the
tribe has waived immunity. However, if the lawsuit involves a non-
governmental function whose only link to the tribe is ownership and
profit-making, then sovereign immunity is improper. This is consis-
tent both with Supreme Court precedent93 and with the policy reasons
outlined in Judge Gould's concurrence in Cook. This approach strikes a
balance between the longstanding doctrine of tribal sovereign immu-
nity and the fairness that is needed when tribes operate businesses
that generate billions of dollars in annual revenues and employ hun-
dreds of thousands of people. Some tribal corporations, such as
92. See Brian C. Lake, The Unlimited Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribal Businesses
Operating Outside the Reservation: An Idea Whose Time Has Gone, 1996 CoLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 87 (1996).
93. See Part II.A, supra.
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housing authorities, still would retain sovereign immunity, because
providing housing could be seen as a governmental function. However,
the operation of a casino or other for-profit venture would not qualify
for immunity.
In his dissent in Kiowa, Justice Stevens argued that by grant-
ing sovereign immunity, the Court is performing a legislative function.
Just as the majority argued that only Congress should have the ability
to restrict tribal sovereign immunity, Stevens argued that Congress,
and not the Supreme Court, should be the one to decide whether tribal
sovereign immunity exists at all:
The fact that Congress may nullify or modify the Court's grant of
virtually unlimited tribal immunity does not justify the Court's per-
formance of a legislative function. The Court is not merely
announcing a rule of comity for federal judges to observe; it is an-
nouncing a rule that pre-empts state power. The reasons that
undergird our strong presumption against construing federal stat-
utes to pre-empt state law.94
As Justice Stevens suggests, the doctrine of tribal sovereign im-
munity should originate from Congress. Instead, however, the Court
has performed the policy-creating role of the legislature by creating
and then expanding sovereign immunity, both for tribes and for corpo-
rations that they own. The next section will demonstrate that Congress
has not sufficiently abrogated the vast immunity that courts have
created.
B. Congress Should Explicitly Abrogate Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Judge Gould's second suggestion-that Congress pass a statute
abrogating tribal sovereign immunity for casino-is constitutional
under the Indian Commerce Clause.95 Although Congress is very lim-
ited in its ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the
Commerce Clause, 9 6 the Supreme Court has not imposed similar limi-
tations on congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity. The
Supreme Court has found that the Indian Commerce Clause is in-
tended to "provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field
of Indian affairs," and that it is "well established that the Interstate
Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses have very different applica-
94. 523 U.S. at 765 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. U.S. CowsT. art. 1, § 8. ("The Congress shall have power . .. To regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes. . .").
96. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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tions."9 7 In fact, the Court in Kiowa stated that it is the job of
Congress-not the courts-to abrogate sovereign immunity.98
Congress, however, has been hesitant to abrogate tribal sover-
eign immunity. In support of its argument, the Kiowa majority
pointed only to two statutes that abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.
The Native American Laws Technical Corrections Act of 200099 re-
quires tribes to carry liability insurance for a limited range of contract
matters and prevents the insurance carrier from raising tribal sover-
eign immunity as a defense. But the statute limits the waiver only to
"claims the amount and nature of which are within the coverage."1 oo
Therefore, the statute only exposes the insurance carrier to liability.
Additionally, the provision covers only a small subset of contracts for
matters such as health and education.
The other statutory abrogation provision in the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act' 0 ' (IGRA), is also limited. Casinos are multi-billion-dol-
lar tribal businesses, and they generate a great deal of litigation.
IGRA only provides federal courts jurisdiction over lawsuits filed by
states seeking to enjoin gaming that violates the tribe-state compact
that formed the casino.102
IGRA's abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity is limited both
by the statute's plain language and by court interpretations of IGRA.
The statute has two important limitations: the lawsuit must involve an
alleged violation of an explicit provision in the gaming compact, and
the lawsuit must have been filed by the state. Therefore, IGRA's abro-
gation provision would not apply to Cook's lawsuit for two reasons: the
plaintiff is a private party, and the suit involves a private tort claim
involving alcohol distribution, something not covered in the compact
between California and the tribe. The Ninth Circuit has held that this
provision abrogates tribal sovereign immunity only with "the express
provisions of a compact."10 3
Even if the statute had given Cook standing to sue, the lawsuit
would still be limited to the terms of the compact. The compact be-
tween the State of Nevada and the Fort Mojave Indian Tribe, which
97. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 193 (1989).
98. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.
99. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(c)(3) (2000).
100. Id.
101. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2000).
102. Id. ("The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over ... any cause of
action initiated by a State or Indian tribe to enjoin a class III gaming activity located on
Indian lands and conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact entered into under
paragraph 3.").
103. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1997).
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owns the casino, does not say anything about tort claims or negli-
gence.104 The thirteen page document, signed in 1990, sets rules for
tribal revenue sharing with the state and gaming regulation. The com-
pact would not provide Cook with a cause of action under which he
could sue the Fort Mojave Indian Tribe.
As the next section will demonstrate, tribal gaming compacts
are limited in their terms and restrictions of tribal sovereign immu-
nity. At best, the abrogation provision of IGRA would allow a state to
sue for injunctive relief, enforcing a provision of the compact. But that
will not solve the problem seen in tort or contract cases, when private
actors allege harm by a large tribe-owned business.
Tribes in six states-Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oregon, and Wisconsin-are governed by Public Law 280, which pro-
vides states with civil and criminal jurisdiction over activities on tribal
lands.105 But the Court has held that the law applies only to private
causes of action and does not grant general civil regulatory authority
over casinos.' 0 6 Public Law 280 did not "abolish Indian immunity from
state jurisdiction." 0 7
Therefore, it is necessary for Congress to pass a new statute
that limits tribal sovereign immunity. IGRA does not provide specific
abrogation. Additionally, IGRA does not cover many tribal businesses,
such as the payday loan company in Ameriloan. Congress should pass
a statute that takes the functionalist approach, which is consistent
with Supreme Court jurisprudence. Such a law would state:
"United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over all
claims brought against tribe-owned corporations acting in a non-gov-
ernmental capacity. Sovereign immunity is not a defense in such
actions."
This statute would address the concerns about unfairness
raised by Judge Gould in his Cook concurrence and the Supreme Court
in Kiowa. The law recognizes that the Supreme Court established sov-
ereign immunity for tribal governments. The law also recognizes that
the rapid growth of gaming and other tribal businesses provides an
increased need for Article III courts to resolve tort and contract dis-
104. Intergovernmental Agreement between State of Nevada and Fort Mojave Indian
Tribe, available at http://www.nigc.gov/Portals/O/NIGC%20Uploads/readingroom/compacts/
Fort%20Mojave%20Indian%20Tribe/Compact%203.27.90.pdf.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2000) ("Each of the States listed . . . shall have jurisdiction
over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the
areas of Indian country listed ... to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over
other civil causes of action.").
106. Cal. v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 210 (1987).
107. In re Humboldt Fir, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 292, 295 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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putes. The law would strike a balance by providing broad language,
essentially allowing courts to determine whether the dispute involves
government functions.
C. States Should Demand Waivers of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
when Negotiating Compacts
In addition to abrogation by the courts or statute, sovereign im-
munity could be limited by voluntary waiver. The Supreme Court has
stated that tribes must explicitly agree to waivers of tribal sovereign
immunity: "[i]t is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot
be implied but must be unequivocally expressed."10 8 State corporation
statutes may contain "sue and be sued" clauses, but courts have found
that is insufficient to find a waiver of sovereign immunity, even if a
tribal corporation's charter explicitly refers to these corporation
statutes.109
The clearest waiver of tribal sovereign immunity in the Indian
gaming context is a provision in the gaming compact, which IGRA re-
quires states and tribes to negotiate before a casino can be formed. But
the limits to sovereign immunity in most compacts are limited. For
example, many casino compacts contain sovereign immunity waivers,
but those waivers are limited only to gaming provisions in the compact.
Therefore, the waiver does not allow many tort and contract claims.
New York State has broader waivers of sovereign immunity in
many of its compacts. For example, the state's compact with the St.
Regis Mohawk tribe contains the following provision:
The Tribe agrees to require the Tribal Gaming Operation to main-
tain liability insurance to compensate injured patrons of Gaming
Facilities. Courts of the State of New York shall adjudicate claims
for personal injury to patrons of Gaming Facilities . . 110
Although this provision gives customers recourse if they are injured at
a casino, it does not waive sovereign immunity for common claims such
as employment discrimination and contract disputes. As demonstrated
in the previous Part, many recent cases have given tribe-owned corpo-
rations immunity for employment and contract lawsuits.
108. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
109. See, e.g., Tuveson v Fla. Governor's Council on Indian Affairs, 734 F.2d 730, 734
(11th Cir. 1984); Howard v. Liberty Mem'l Hosp., 752 F. Supp. 1074, 1077 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
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Some compacts in New York and elsewhere have even weaker
sovereign immunity waivers. For example, the compact between New
York and Seneca Nation only waives sovereign immunity for disputes
between the state and the tribe regarding terms of the compact, such
as revenue-sharing. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of New York found that the sovereign immunity waiver does not allow
a former employee to bring a Family and Medical Leave Act claim
against the casino. 1 1
Courts have blamed the failure of states to negotiate sue-or-be-
sued clauses in the compacts with tribes. For example, in Kizis v.
Morse Disel International, Inc.112 the Supreme Court of Connecticut
found that casino employees were immune from a negligence suit be-
cause the casino was owned by a tribe." 3 The court noted that the
state could have included a mechanism for tort lawsuits against tribal
businesses in the compact it negotiated. But it did not.114 "As a result
of these negotiations, the tribe maintained jurisdiction over tort ac-
tions of this type."" 5
Some compacts, including the one in Kizis, require the tribes to
provide internal adjudication of tort claims against the tribe related to
the casino. Although this is a positive step, it is not an adequate sub-
stitute for adjudication by a neutral Article III judge. For example, the
compact for the Foxwoods Resort in Connecticut contains two
sentences that provide tort remedies for patrons. It states that the
tribe "will establish reasonable procedures for the disposition of tort
claims arising from alleged injuries to patrons of its gaming facili-
ties." 6 The compact provides very little guidance for the form of such
a process stating that while it may be "analogous" to a state court, it
also may be similar to "another remedial system as may be appropri-
ate."117 There is no assurance that the plaintiff would receive an
unbiased and fair hearing by an impartial adjudicator. The tribe has
111. Myers v. Seneca Niagara Casino, 488 F. Supp. 2d 166, 170 (N.D.N.Y 2006) ("The
Compact's terms do not address employment and benefits of workers/employees. Therefore,
it would be too broad of a reading to find that simply because immunity was waived as to
gaming activities in a Compact between the Nation and State of New York under the IGRA,
that immunity was also waived for unrelated employment claims under the FMLA.").
112. 794 A.2d 498 (Ct. 2002).
113. Id. See also Worrall v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, 131 F. Supp. 2d
328 (D. Ct. 2001).
114. Kizis, 794 A.2d at 505.
115. Id.






no incentive to create such a process. Additionally, the provision is
limited to alleged injuries. It does not provide any remedies for other
tort claims or contract disputes. Therefore, the compacts leave many of
the tribal casino business partners and patrons with a complete inabil-
ity to adjudicate claims.
Because of the unfair results in many of the cases described in
Part III, states should aggressively insist on sovereign immunity waiv-
ers in their compacts. Such waivers should provide federal district
courts with jurisdiction over all tort and contract claims filed against
the casinos. The tribe, by signing the compact, would explicitly agree
to the waiver, satisfying the requirements set forth in Santa Clara
Pueblo. Of course, these negotiations would only apply to new casino
proposals, because the compacts for existing casinos have already been
negotiated, with no waivers. Therefore, to address the problem seen in
Cook, it is necessary either for the Supreme Court to clarify its caselaw
or Congress to pass a statute abrogating tribal sovereign immunity.
V. CONCLUSION
As tribal businesses continue to grow, their sovereign immunity
increasingly creates inequities. From its 1919 Turner decision to its
recent Kiowa opinion, the Supreme Court never intended to allow such
for-profit businesses to receive the immunity of sovereign govern-
ments. Within the existing doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court,
lower courts should deny sovereign immunity to casinos and other tri-
bal businesses that do not perform governmental functions. But
because courts have been reluctant to impose any limits, Congress
should do so. Further, states should insist that tribes agree to waive
sovereign immunity as a condition of compacts for new casinos.
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